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Cooperation is the backbone of modern human societies, making it a priority to understand how successful
cooperation-sustaining mechanisms operate. Cyclic dominance, a non-transitive setup comprising at least three
strategies wherein the first strategy overrules the second which overrules the third which, in turn, overrules
the first strategy, is known to maintain bio-diversity, drive competition between bacterial strains, and preserve
cooperation in social dilemmas. Here, we present a novel route to cyclic dominance in voluntary social dilemmas
by adding to the traditional mix of cooperators, defectors, and loners, a fourth player type, risk-averse hedgers,
who enact tit-for-tat upon paying a hedging cost to avoid being exploited. When this cost is sufficiently small,
cooperators, defectors, and hedgers enter a loop of cyclic dominance that preserves cooperation even under
the most adverse conditions. In contrast, when the hedging cost is large, hedgers disappear, consequently
reverting to the traditional interplay of cooperators, defectors, and loners. In the interim region of hedging costs,
complex evolutionary dynamics ensues, prompting transitions between states with two, three, or four competing
strategies. Our results thus reveal that voluntary participation is but one pathway to sustained cooperation via
cyclic dominance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale cooperation is a basis for solving key societal
problems including climate inaction [1, 2], resource over-
exploitation [3–5], imperfect vaccination [6–9], antibiotic
overuse [10], crime occurrence [11], and epidemic outbreaks
[12, 13]. Cooperativeness as an altruistic act [14] entails a
cost for the actor in order for the recipient to enjoy a ben-
efit. Cooperators are therefore fundamentally challenged
by the most basic principles of Darwinian evolution, i.e.,
why should anyone act selflessly if only the fittest succeed?
This puzzle has mobilized an unprecedented spectrum of re-
searchers across disciplines to seek out mechanisms that sus-
tain and/or promote cooperation [14–21].
Social dilemmas, a construct of evolutionary game theory
[22–24], capture the essence of the cooperation puzzle by
contrasting individual and collective interests [25–28]. An
important subclass of social dilemmas is the voluntary social
dilemma [29, 30], in which loners shape the evolutionary dy-
namics alongside traditional cooperators and defectors. Lon-
ers are risk-averse, and to avoid getting exploited they resort
to an exceedingly simple strategy that generates a small fixed
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income regardless of what their opponents do. This prompts
the emergence of cyclic dominance, whereby cooperators
dominate loners who dominate defectors who dominate co-
operators, thus sustaining cooperation while strategy abun-
dances keep oscillating [31]. Cyclic dominance emerges
elsewhere too, e.g., in the public goods game with correlated
punishment and reward [32], in the ultimatum game with dis-
crete strategies [33], in social dilemmas with jokers [34], and
by means of co-evolution [35, 36].
Cyclic dominance is often employed to study biodiver-
sity [37–45] and competition in microbial populations [40,
46, 47]. The subject of cyclic dominance is reviewed in
detail in Ref. [44]. Interestingly, when finite-size effects
are taken into account, cyclic dominance may fail to sus-
tain biodiversity and may even be responsible for extinc-
tion [48]. Further results indicate that competition is key for
sustaining biodiversity whilst ecosystem-wide patterns form
by means of cyclical interactions [49]. Dynamically gen-
erated cyclic dominance, apart from sustaining biodiversity,
offers alternative ways to sustain cooperators even in the face
of large temptation to defect [50]. Considering more than
three species in ecosystems, the existence of a phase with
global oscillations, especially if the interaction graph con-
tains multiple subloops and local cycles, prompts the con-
jecture that global oscillations are a general characteristic
of realistic food webs [51]. Meanwhile, considering more
than three strategies in evolutionary games shows that cyclic
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2FIG. 1: Hedgers and loners interchangeably support cooperation via cyclic dominance. A, When hedging costs are low, α = 0.05, hedgers
are more competitive than loners and manage to support cooperation via cyclic dominance over the full range of temptation payoffs. B,
When hedging costs are intermediate, α = 0.22, hedgers are more competitive than loners only over a limited range of temptation payoffs.
Cooperation is, nonetheless, supported via cyclic dominance as loners assume an analogous role to hedgers while the temptation payoff
stays relatively low. C, With high hedging costs, α = 0.4, hedgers are no longer competitive at all. Cooperation is then maintained via
cyclic dominance solely by loners. Simulation and pair-approximation results differ quantitatively, but they tell the same story qualitatively.
dominance emerges as an unexpected escape route from the
adverse effects of antisocial punishment, also providing an
explanation as to why second-order free-riding may not im-
pede the evolutionary stability of punishment [52]. Here, we
considerably expand the scope of cyclic dominance in the
generic and broadly adaptable setting of the voluntary social
dilemma. Motivated by the ubiquity of risk aversion in the
real world, we introduce a fourth player type, hedgers, who
are also risk-averse, but in a more sophisticated and produc-
tive way than loners. Instead of avoiding meaningful interac-
tion altogether, hedgers are willing to pay a hedging cost that
allows them to learn the strategy of their opponents and thus
avoid getting exploited. Specifically, a hedger enacts tit-for-
tat play, but without cooperation in the first move [53–55]. If
the opponent defects, the hedger also defects, whereas if the
opponent cooperates, the hedger also cooperates.
In the described setting, hedgers may replace loners in a
closed loop of dominance such that defectors invade coop-
erators, but cooperators invade hedgers, and hedgers invade
defectors. We thus report a novel route to cyclic dominance
in the voluntary social dilemma made possible by risk aver-
sion. Strategy abundances again oscillate in time, but oscil-
lations are now maintained via more elaborate and produc-
tive means than the simplistic loner strategy [31]. This is
possible when the cost of hedging is sufficiently low. When
the cost of hedging gets high, loners dominate hedgers, and
we recover the original voluntary dilemma. For intermedi-
ate hedging costs, other solutions are also stable, including a
four-strategy state in which all competing strategies coexist,
or a two-strategy state in which cooperators and defectors
coexist as is common in spatial prisoner’s dilemma [56].
We hereafter proceed by detailing the mathematical
model, describing the main results, and discussing their
broader implications. We envision more direct applications
to complex social systems, yet adaptations to biological sys-
tems also seem plausible.
II. MATHEMATICAL MODEL
Our model is a variant of the prisoner’s dilemma game
(PDG) extended to incorporate loners and hedgers. In a com-
mon PDG [53], mutual cooperation is rewarded by the re-
ward payoff, R, whereas mutual defection is punished by the
punishment payoff, P . Furthermore, defection is encouraged
by the largest payoff, temptation T , while cooperation is dis-
couraged by the lowest sucker’s payoff, S. This is because
of the payoff ranking T > R > P > S, and the fact that
T is earned by a defector upon meeting a cooperator who
then earns S. In the repeated version of the game, it is addi-
tionally assumed that 2R > T + S [2]. The corresponding
bilateral payoff matrix is given in Table I. Although the game
seems to be defined by four payoffs, there is a well known
rescaling to two parameters that leaves the evolutionary dy-
namics unaffected [26]. For even more simplicity, studies
oftentimes resort to the weak PDG [56], in which only one
parameter, T = b, controls how strong the dilemma is in the
sense that the larger the value of b, the stronger is the temp-
tation to defect. The other payoffs are simplified to R = 1
and P = S = 0.
TABLE I: Bilateral payoff matrix in the basic prisoner’s dilemma
game. A way to interpret this matrix is to assume that the payoff in a
particular row and column is earned when a strategy in the first row
is met with a strategy in the first column. Thus, payoff S is earned
by a cooperator C meeting a defector D. The payoff order is T >
R > P > S to encourage defection and discourage cooperation.
Also, 2R > T +S makes mutual cooperation (2R) more beneficial
for the collective than defecting against a cooperator (T + S).
C D
C R S
D T P
3We extended the weak PDG to include loners and hedgers.
A loner avoids complications by always earning a small pay-
off, σb, which is also earned by anyone who meets the
loner. A hedger, by contrast, is much more sophisticated.
Due to the hedger’s risk aversion, they pay a hedging cost,
α, to learn the opponent’s strategy, and then enact tit-for-tat
play by cooperating with a cooperator or defecting against a
defector. With the payoffs of all four strategies defined (Ta-
ble II), it is worthwhile to briefly examine implications for
the evolutionary dynamics.
Focusing momentarily on the CDL combination of play-
ers [29, 30], we see that in the absence of cooperators, loners
receive the same or larger payoff than defectors, giving the
former strategy a decisive evolutionary advantage over the
latter. The situation is similar for defectors against coopera-
tors in the absence of loners, and for cooperators against lon-
ers in the absence of defectors. Based on these observations,
it is a fair guess even before running any simulations that
cyclic dominance may emerge, especially when the game is
embedded into a spatial structure.
For the CDH combination of players, the setup is some-
what different. The relation between cooperators and defec-
tors in the absence of hedgers remains unchanged, of course,
and the relation between cooperators and hedgers mimics
that of cooperators and loners because, in the absence of de-
fectors, it is cooperators who always attain a larger payoff.
The relation between defectors and hedgers is complicated
by the fact that, in the absence of cooperators, either strat-
egy may earn more depending on who interacts with whom
and what the exact value of hedging cost α is. Nonetheless,
when the cost is small and hedgers sufficiently abundant,
they should be able to overcome defection, possibly giving
rise to cyclic dominance once again. We examined this sup-
position using Monte Carlo simulations [2, 58] as well as the
pair approximation technique [2, 59] (Supplementary infor-
mation). Monte Carlo simulations of evolutionary games are
an individual-based approach in which actions of each indi-
vidual are implemented explicitly to generate a payoff that is
then compared to the payoffs of other individuals, followed
by imitation of those who performed better. Simulations are
typically run until the system reaches a stable state as in-
dicated by an order parameter, e.g., the fraction of cooper-
ators. The pair approximation method provides alternative
means of tracking the system’s state. Specifically, by focus-
ing on the frequencies and the proportions of strategy pairs,
the method yields a set of differential equations that should
TABLE II: Bilateral payoff matrix of the four-strategy model. As in
Table I, the payoff in a particular row and column is earned when a
strategy in the first row is met with a strategy in the first column. For
example, payoff b is earned by a defector D meeting a cooperator
C, whereas payoff σ is earned by a hedger H meeting a loner L.
C D L H
C 1 0 σ 1
D b 0 σ 0
L σ σ σ σ
H 1-α -α σ 1-α
implicitly encode the behaviors that are explicit in Monte
Carlo simulations. As such, pair approximation can be used
to verify the results of Monte Carlo simulations or offer a
different perspective on particular outcomes.
For the purpose of Monte Carlo simulations, we arranged
a total of N = L2 agents to form a square lattice of length
L with periodic boundary conditions. Each agent is charac-
terized by a strategy vector, Sx = (pCx , p
D
x , p
L
x , p
H
x )
T , where
p∗x is the probability with which agent x behaves as a coop-
erator, defector, loner, or hedger. A direct consequence is
that pCx + p
D
x + p
L
x + p
H
x = 1. We additionally imposed that
exactly one p∗x equals unity, meaning that the only four pos-
sible strategy vectors for agent x are Sx = (1, 0, 0, 0)T≡C,
Sx = (0, 1, 0, 0)
T≡D, Sx = (0, 0, 1, 0)T≡L, and Sx =
(0, 0, 0, 1)T≡H . Then the payoff earned by this agent in a
single round of the game is
Px =
∑
y∈Nx
Sx
TMSy, (1)
where Nx is the set of agent x’s neighbors, M is the matrix
of elementary payoffs as displayed in Table II, and Sy is the
strategy vector of x’s neighbor y. Depending on the earned
payoffs, agents update their strategies using the Fermi rule
[2, 58], which ensures that poorer performing players even-
tually adopt the strategies of their better performing coun-
terparts. Specifically, agent x imitates the strategy of a ran-
domly chosen neighbor y ∈ Nx with probability
WSx←Sy =
1
1 + exp
(
Px−Py
K
) , (2)
where K quantifies the irrationality of selection, i.e., the
larger the K is, the greater the probability that agent x imi-
tates agent y even if Px > Py .
To run simulations from this point on, we only needed
to specify parameter values. The payoff parameter whose
value was held constant throughout this study is σ = 0.3.
To uphold constraint 2R > T + S, we examined temptation
payoffs in the range 1≤b≤2; b=2 thus signifies the strongest
dilemma. Furthermore, we presented the results for hedg-
ing costs in the range 0≤α≤0.4 because there are no qual-
itative changes in the system’s behavior for α > 0.4. The
lattice size systematically varied in the range 200≤L≤1500
to make sure that the results are not due to the finite size
effects. The closed neighborhood was von Neumann’s [58]
throughout the study. Relative to an arbitrarily selected fo-
cal agent, such a neighborhood includes the closest ’north’,
’east’, ’south’, and ’west’ agents, implying a constant node
degree of k = 4. Finally, the irrationality of selection param-
eter was kept constant at K = 0.1. We ran each simulation
over 50 000 time steps to guarantee that the transient dynam-
ics had passed.
III. RESULTS
Simulations reveal that hedgers are able to support co-
operation via cyclic dominance. When the hedging cost is
4t=O f=100 f=200 f=300 f=50000 
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FIG. 2: Hedging costs shape the fate of hedgers. Shown are the snapshots of evolutionary dynamics at different time steps (columns) and
for different hedging costs (rows). Early in the evolutionary dynamics, defectors invade cooperators who invade hedgers who invade loners.
Later, however, it is hedging costs that determine the fate of hedgers. When these costs are low (upper row), hedgers pay little for denying
defectors the temptation payoff, as well as enjoying the reward payoff together with cooperators. All this helps hedgers to outlive loners
who eventually disappear. When hedging costs are high (bottom row), risk aversion is a burden that cannot be offset by the reward payoff.
Hedgers eventually disappear. Finally, when hedging costs are intermediate (middle row), there is a balance of power of sorts between
hedgers and loners, and all four strategies survive. The irregular mixing of strategies after transient evolutionary dynamics is a signature of
cyclic dominance.
sufficiently low, hedgers outlive loners and remain abun-
dant over the whole range of temptation payoffs (Fig. 1A).
In doing so, hedgers enter into a loop of cyclic dominance
with cooperators and defectors, helping the former to avoid
being overrun by the latter. How this transpires is more
clearly seen in the snapshots of evolutionary dynamics in
which defectors invade cooperators who invade hedgers who
invade loners early on (second column in Fig. 2). After-
wards, however, hedgers maintain their presence by pay-
ing little cost while denying defectors the temptation payoff
and enjoying the reward payoff with cooperators (top row in
Fig. 2). Under such conditions, loners are the least competi-
tive player type whose eventual disappearance marks the be-
ginning of cyclic dominance between cooperators, defectors,
and hedgers. That these player types indeed cyclically dom-
inate one another is reflected in the irregular mixing pattern
of agents post transient evolutionary dynamics (fifth column
in Fig. 2).
Loners start replacing hedgers as the hedging cost in-
creases. This first happens for small (Fig. 1B) and then all
(Fig. 1C) values of the temptation payoff. Despite losing the
support from hedgers, cooperators do not succumb to defec-
tors because it is now loners who enter the loop of cyclic
dominance. The snapshots of evolutionary dynamics illus-
trate this turn of events. As hedgers become overburdened
by their risk-averse strategy due to the high hedging cost,
they become the least competitive player type and eventu-
ally die out (bottom row in Fig. 2). The recognizable irreg-
ular mixing pattern of agents engaged in cyclic dominance
resurfaces again after transient evolutionary dynamics, but
now with loners having taken the place of hedgers. Interest-
ingly, although hedgers and loners almost entirely exclude
one another, there is a narrow window of hedging costs and
temptation payoffs in which these two player types coexist
alongside cooperators and defectors (middle row in Fig. 2).
To glimpse into the heart of cyclic dominance, we esti-
mated invasion rates post transient evolutionary dynamics.
If strategy Sx had been invaded by strategy Sy , we defined
the corresponding invasion rate, wSx←Sy > 0, as the net
positive fraction of transitions from strategy Sx to strategy
Sy , mediated by the Fermi rule in a single Monte Carlo time
step. With four player types, six invasions had been possi-
ble. These happened to be wC←D, wL←C , wH←C , wD←L,
wD←H , and wL←H .
Invasion rates clearly demonstrate cyclic dominance in
action. For an intermediate temptation payoff, b = 1.5,
and relatively low hedging costs, cooperators, defectors, and
hedgers get locked in a cyclic dominance loop as evidenced
5FIG. 3: Average invasion rates reveal cyclic dominance in action.
A, Fixing the temptation payoff to b = 1.5, we plotted average
invasion rates as the functions of hedging costs, α. For small α val-
ues, cyclic dominance between cooperators, defectors, and hedgers
(light-blue area) is reflected in the fact that defectors invade coop-
erators who invade hedgers who invade defectors all with the same
average invasion rate. For large α values, the situation is analo-
gous, except that loners take the place of hedgers (light-red area).
For a narrow window of intermediate α values, the two cyclic dom-
inance loops intermix, with hedgers actually invading loners with
a small invasion rate (wL←H ) that is more than compensated for
by loners invading defectors (wD←L > wL←H ), which enables all
four strategies to coexist. B, Similar results are obtained by fixing
the hedging cost to an intermediate value of α = 0.22, and then
varying the temptation benefit. Here, cyclic dominance with loners
emerges for small b values (light-red area), whereas cyclic domi-
nance with hedgers emerges for large b value (light-blue area).
FIG. 4: Hedgers and loners protect cooperators even in the harshest
of conditions. Shown is the time evolution of strategies such that,
initially, there is a one giant cluster of cooperators (red) surrounded
by defectors (blue), and two smaller clusters of cooperators sepa-
rated from defectors by a thin layer of hedgers (green) in one case
and loners (gray) in the other. The temptation payoff, b = 2.0,
is at the maximum of the prisoner’s dilemma limits. The hedging
cost of α = 0.32 is intermediate. Under such conditions, the giant
cooperative cluster quickly erodes under exploitation by defectors.
Smaller cooperative clusters, by contrast, turn into mixes of coop-
erators, defectors, and loners or hedgers, that spread like ripples
across a lattice, here, of size L = 500.
by the equality of invasion rateswC←D = wD←H = wH←C
(Fig. 3A). All invasion rates involving loners equal zero be-
cause players of this type get outcompeted. As hedging
costs increase, the fortunes of hedgers and loners reverse,
and now the latter get locked in the cyclic dominance loop
with cooperators and defectors as indicated by equalities
wC←D = wD←L = wL←C (Fig. 3A). All invasion rates
involving hedgers equal zero because hedgers get outcom-
peted, just as loners did in the opposite situation. All four
player types coexists only over a narrow window of interme-
diate hedging costs. Here, cooperators are drained in favor of
defectors, but replenished at the expense of hedgers and lon-
ers, i.e., wC←D = wH←C + wL←C . Defectors are drained
in favor of hedgers and loners, but replenished at the expense
of cooperators, i.e., wD←H + wD←L = wC←D. Loners
are drained in favor of hedgers and cooperators, but replen-
ished at the expense of defectors, i.e., wL←H + wL←C =
wD←L. Finally, hedgers are drained in favor of coopera-
tors, but replenished at the expense of defectors and lon-
ers, i.e., wH←C = wD←H + wL←H . Completely anal-
ogous results hold when the hedging cost is intermediate,
α = 0.22, and the temptation payoff increases in the range
1≤b≤2 (Fig. 3B).
Cyclic dominance emerges rather independently of the ini-
tial conditions and even in the face of the strongest dilemma,
b = 2.0. To demonstrate this, we present simulations of
the evolutionary dynamics starting from one large cluster of
cooperators surrounded entirely by defectors, and two small
6FIG. 5: Cyclic dominance is a widespread phenomenon. Shown are
the phase diagrams due to Monte Carlo simulations and the pair ap-
proximation, revealing the model’s dynamical regimes as function
of the hedging cost and the temptation payoff. A, Cyclic dominance
arises almost everywhere in the phase space of Monte Carlo simu-
lations, with hedgers surviving at low and loners at high hedging
costs. There is also a narrow domain in which all four strategies
coexist. B, Pair approximation yields a qualitatively similar distri-
bution of strategy prevalences. Dashed red curves delineate sub-
domains where the system converges to limit cycles by which the
abundances of surviving player types oscillate in time (see Fig. 6).
clusters of cooperators, but separated from defectors by a
thin layer of hedgers in one case and loners in the other
(Fig. 4). Setting the hedging cost to an intermediate value,
α = 0.32, we find that defectors quickly chip away at the
large cooperative cluster, while smaller cooperative clusters
turn into a mix of cooperators, defectors, and hedgers or lon-
ers, and spread in a ripple-like manner through the lattice,
until cyclic dominance becomes omnipresent (Fig. 4).
To fully understand evolutionary dynamics as a function
of the temptation payoff and the hedging cost, we mapped
the system’s phase space. We found four distinct phases: co-
operators and defectors only (C+D), cooperators-defectors-
hedgers (C+D+H), cooperators-defectors-loners (C+D+
L), and all four player types (C + D + L + H). When the
temptation benefit is very small, the dilemma is minimal and
the system evolves to the C + D phase irrespective of the
hedging cost (Fig. 5A). As the temptation payoff increases,
it is the hedging cost that largely determines how the system
evolves. For relatively small hedging costs, the C +D +H
phase is prevalent, whereas for relatively large hedging costs,
the C + D + L phase is prevalent (Fig. 5A). There is only
a narrow window of intermediate hedging costs in which the
system evolves to the C + D + L + H phase (Fig. 5A),
showing again that hedgers and loners almost interchange-
ably support cooperation through cyclic dominance. The
pair approximation yields a qualitatively similar phase dia-
gram, despite some obvious quantitative differences relative
to Monte Carlo simulations (Fig. 5B).
It is not entirely equivalent whether cyclic dominance is
established by hedgers or loners. Namely, in the spatial vol-
untary dilemma, cyclic dominance gives rise to oscillating
strategy abundances everywhere on the b–α phase diagram,
but without spatial structure only cyclic dominance involving
hedgers can do so. Fixing the temptation payoff to b = 2.0
and choosing a low hedging cost of α = 0.02 places the sys-
tem in theC+D+H phase such that the pair approximation
generates an open cycle trajectory that converges to a planar
limit cycle (Fig. 6A). The limit cycle is planar because loners
die out and the sum of strategy abundances for the remaining
three player types is constrained to unity. Increasing the cost
of hedging to a higher value of α = 0.32 sets the system into
the C +D + L+H phase in which evolutionary dynamics
converges to a three-dimensional limit cycle (Fig. 6B) be-
cause now all four player types co-exist, but their abundances
are still constrained to unity. Finally, with a high hedging
cost of α = 0.4, the system is pushed into the C + D + L
phase, where the pair approximation yields a trajectory with
small open cycles that disappear as the system converges to
a stable equilibrium with zero hedgers (Fig. 6C). A degree
of cooperation is still maintained in such an equilibrium, but
cyclic dominance as the underlying cause stays masked by
the static outcome of evolutionary dynamics.
IV. DISCUSSION
Herein, we revealed a novel route to cyclic dominance in
voluntary social dilemmas brought about by risk averse play-
ers called hedgers. These players outwit defectors by paying
a hedging cost to avoid getting exploited. In the presence
of cooperators, however, risk aversion is redundant and thus
a burden that hampers performance. Hedgers accordingly
invade defectors, defectors—as usual in social dilemmas—
invade cooperators, and cooperators invade hedgers to close
the loop of cyclic dominance. This effectively sustains coop-
eration even under adverse conditions, when the temptation
to defect is high. Moreover, this shows that cooperativeness
by way of cyclic dominance can emerge due to more elabo-
rate and productive means than the exceedingly simple loner
7FIG. 6: Exceeding simplicity of the loner strategy is manifest in the absence of an explicit spatial structure. Specifically, when approximating
the system using pair approximation, hedgers can still maintain cyclic dominance such that strategy abundances oscillate in time, but loners
cannot. A, With low hedging costs, α = 0.02, and a sufficiently large temptation payoff, b = 2.0, loners quickly disappear as the system
converges to a planar limit cycle with positive cooperator, defector, and hedger abundances. The limit cycle is planar because the three
strategy abundances must sum to unity. B, When the hedging cost increases to α = 0.32, all four strategies coexist and the system
converges to a three-dimensional limit cycle. The limit cycle is three-dimensional because strategy abundances must again sum to unity. C,
With high hedging costs, α = 0.40, it is hedgers, and with them oscillations in strategy abundances, who quickly disappear. The system
thus approaches a stable equilibrium of cooperator, defector, and loner strategies. The colorbar indicates time steps.
strategy.
Hedgers may superficially resemble a simple hybrid of co-
operators and defectors, yet as risk-averse conditional coop-
erators they are much more. Plain conditional cooperators,
due to their relationship to the tit-for-tat strategy [60], have
played a central role in the studies on the evolution of co-
operation [61–63]. Adding to this the fact that risk aversion
is ubiquitous in real life [64], the importance of considering
risk-averse conditional cooperators can hardly be overstated.
Our research has important implications for promoting
and sustaining cooperation in human societies. An increas-
ing realism via higher strategic complexity [65–67] is nec-
essarily accompanied with an increasing complexity of evo-
lutionary outcomes as they become dependent not just on
individual strategic relations prescribed by payoff elements,
but also on dynamical relations and spontaneously emerging
alliances between strategy subsets [44]. Cyclic dominance
with hedgers is one such example, but we expect to see many
more in the near future. This, in turn, predicts considerable
challenges in steering complex social systems towards a de-
sired cooperative state. Simple interventions, as frequently
enacted by decision makers, often turn out to be naive and
risky propositions precisely because of a limited understand-
ing of the underlying spatio-temporal dynamics that govern
social complexity. Relevant examples include producing and
appointing inadequately trained personnel [68], flawed mod-
els and agency costs associated with those models [69], mis-
understanding or ignoring systemic risks [70], etc.
Aside from applications to social dynamics, it is possible
to envision analogous, if more complicated, setups in biolog-
ical systems as well. Living tissues are genetically identical
cell structures of the same differentiation fate that work co-
operatively to support homeostasis [71]. Such cooperative
cell structures are susceptible to cheating [71], i.e., individ-
ual cells occasionally defect and turn malignant by either in-
creasing their own fitness or decreasing the fitness of the sur-
rounding cells [72–74]. The system is, furthermore, policed
by free-ranging immune cells that scan for malignant activ-
ity [75, 76], and actively punish defectors at a cost [77, 78],
while receiving a compensation for that cost through inter-
actions with cooperative cells. In this sense, cooperative
cells would not “invade”, but rather “modulate” the activ-
ity of immune cells, yet the resulting dynamics should still
resemble cyclic dominance. Understanding such dynamics
by, for example, mapping the system’s phase space, could
help to devise novel treatments for controlling malignant ac-
tivity [76, 79].
While there is a potential for widespread uses, we hope
that our research will, at the very least, lead to better under-
standing of cooperation in social dilemmas. In this context,
a particularly promising way forward is to pair up theoreti-
cal treatises of evolutionary game dynamics with laboratory
[80, 81] and even field experiments. Doing so should put
theory to the test, help identify more solid fundamentals on
which to build upon, and overall strongly aid the quest for a
better and more sustainable future.
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iSupplementary information
Pair approximation
Local spatial interactions on a lattice are often key to un-
derstanding dynamical processes. To capture important fea-
tures of the local spatial behaviour, a commonly employed
technique is pair approximation, which focuses on tracking
the frequencies and the proportions of strategy pairs.
In the following, we derive equations that capture the dy-
namics of pair proportions in an evolutionary game with four
strategies,C,D, L, andH , taking place on a large square lat-
tice. To that end, we first define the space and the variables of
interest, then we specify relationships that estimate configu-
ration and transition probabilities, and finally, we list differ-
ential equations for pair proportions. Notation and deriva-
tions hereafter follow existing literature, with some addi-
tional details to make the exposition reader-friendly [S1–S3].
Space. In an evolutionary game with four strategies, ev-
ery node of a network comprising N nodes is in one of the
four states, C, D, L, or H , respectively denoting coopera-
tors, defectors, loners, and hedgers. Let Σ = {C,D,L,H}
be a set of states. Each node i is in state ωi, ωi ∈ Σ. The
state of the network is then ω = (ωi) ∈ Ω, where Ω = ΣN
is the set of all possible network states. Vector functions
s : Ω → {0, 1}N , s = c,d, l,h, indicate network nodes
in states S = C,D,L,H , respectively. In other words,
s (ω) = (si (ω)), where
si (ω) =
{
1 if ωi = S,
0 otherwise.
(S1)
Adjacency matrix A, i.e., the matrix of links, is an N×N
symmetrical matrix such that Aij = 1 if nodes i and j are
linked, and Aij = 0 otherwise. No node is connected to
itself, implying that Aii = 0. In the case of a large square
lattice, each node is connected to n = 4 neighbouring nodes,
further implying that
∑n
j=1Aij = 4.
Variables. Our goal is to trace the dynamics of a small
set of variables well-defined on set Ω. Variables containing
information on global and local abundances of strategies are:
Number of nodes in state S
[S] =
N∑
i=1
si = s
T 1 (S2)
Number of (S, S′) strategy pairs
[S : S′] =
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
Aijsis
′
j = s
T As′ (S3)
Average number of S neighbouring S′
[S|S′] = [S : S
′]
[S′]
(S4)
From these definitions, it follows that [S3]∑
S
[S] = N, (S5)∑
S′
[S : S′] = n [S] , (S6)
∑
S′′
[S : S′ : S′′] =
n(n− 1)
N
[S] [S′] , (S7)
where once again N is the total number of nodes in the net-
work, and n is the average node degree. Note that Eq. (S5) is
exact, whereas Eqs. (S6 & S7) hold exactly only for regular
networks; for other random networks these equations hold
in expectation. Furthermore, Eqs. (S5 & S6) imply that the
total number of pairs equals nN , or in the case of a large
square lattice 4·N .
From Eq. (S3), we can formally derive
[S : S′] = sTAs′ =
(
sTAs′
)T
= s′TAs = [S′ : S] .
(S8)
This relationship prescribes how to count node pairs.
Namely, the number of (S, S′) pairs is given as follows: for
each focal node i in state S, count its neighbouring nodes j
in state S′ to obtain the total number of (S, S′) pairs in the
network. Furthermore, the symmetry of adjacency matrix
Aij dictates that, if S = S′, a pair of neighbouring nodes i
and j in state (S, S) will be counted twice, once when i is
the focal node, and once when j is the focal node. If S 6= S′,
the same does not apply. Pair (S, S′) is counted as such only
when node i is the focal node. When one of the neighbour-
ing nodes j is the focal node, then the same pair should be
treated as (S′, S). A direct consequence is that
[S : S′] = [S′ : S] , (S9)
just as formally stated above.
Global and local densities. With Eqs. (S2-S4) in place,
we can define global densities:
pS =
[S]
N
, pSS′ =
[S : S′]
nN
, (S10)
and local densities:
qS|S′ =
pSS′
pS′
, qS|S′S′′ =
pSS′S′′
pS′S′′
, (S11)
where pS represents the global proportion of nodes in state
S, pSS′ the global proportion of SS′ = (S, S′) pairs, qS|S′
the average proportion of S-neighbours of nodes in state S′,
and qS|S′S” the average proportion of S-neighbours of S′S′′
pairs.
Pair approximation is based on three conditions, (i) com-
patibility, (ii) symmetry, and (iii) closure [S2]. Compatibility
with the mean-field theory is secured via
pS =
∑
S′
pSS′ (S12)
ii
FIG. S1: Small part of a square lattice indicating the relevant con-
figuration employed in the pair approximation technique. This
configuration is used in determining pair transition probabilities
pSS′→S′S′ .
which follows from Eq. (S6), whereas symmetry
pSS′ = pS′S (S13)
is a direct consequence of Eq. (S9). The concept of closure
is somewhat more elaborate.
Achieving closure requires devising an approximation for
proportions of larger node clusters. The ordinary pair ap-
proximation assumes that neighbours of neighbours have
only minuscule effects no matter which focal node is looked
at. This implies that
qS|S′S” = qS|S′ . (S14)
Thus the probability of finding a triplet of nodes in state
SS′S′′ = (S, S′, S′′) is approximated as
pSS′S′′ = qS|S′S′′ pS′S′′ = qS|S′ pS′S′′ =
=
pSS′pS′S”
pS′
. (S15)
Furthermore, the probability of finding a cluster of eight
nodes configured as shown in Fig. S1 becomes
pxyzSS′uvw =
pxSpySpzSpSS′puS′pvS′pwS′
p3Sp
3
S′
. (S16)
Adoption and transition probabilities. In evolutionary
games with pairwise comparisons, a randomly chosen focal
node, i, updates its strategy S by comparing own payoff PS
with payoff PS′ of a randomly chosen neighbour, j, who
opted for strategy S′. Node i adopts strategy S′ with proba-
bility
WS←S′ =
1
1 + exp
(
PS−PS′
K
) . (S17)
Payoffs PS and PS′ are accumulated in interactions with
neighbouring nodes. ParameterK quantifies the irrationality
of selection, i.e., the larger the value of K, the greater is the
probability of adopting S′ in favour of S even if PS > PS′ .
Quantity WS←S′ is called the probability of adoption.
When deriving equations for pair approximation, it is gen-
erally a good idea to keep in mind information on local con-
figurations of strategies. Following the notation in Fig. S1,
strategies neighbouring S are x, y, z, and S′, while strategies
neighbouring S′ are u, v, w, and S. For the purpose of keep-
ing track of what goes on in the neighbourhoods of S and
S′, we introduce extended labels for adoption probabilities
as follows
WS←S′ = W (P
xyz
S ← PuvwS′ ). (S18)
Now we can calculate the probability that the pair of strate-
gies SS′ transitions into S′S′:
pSS′→S′S′ =
∑
x,y,z
∑
u,v,w
W (P xyzS ← PuvwS′ )
· pxSpySpzSpSS′puS′pvS′pwS′
p3Sp
3
S′
. (S19)
Here the summations go over all possible configurations
(Fig. S1) whose probabilities are given by Eq. (S16). Quan-
tity pSS′→S′S′ is called the probability of transition.
Pair equations. Let us for the moment focus on one
specific pair of nodes whose strategies are TT ′. When the
node with strategy T adopts the neighbour’s strategy T ′,
T 6=T ′, all possible global densities pSS′ for which either
S or S′ ∈ {T, T ′} undergo a change. To find how ex-
actly global densities pSS′ change in response to transition
TT ′→T ′T ′, we need several ingredients.
The first ingredient is transition probability pTT ′→T ′T ′ .
For any combination of strategies T, T ′∈Σ, T 6=T ′, the
recipe for calculating transition probability pTT ′→T ′T ′ is
given by Eq. (S19). If, for example, T = C and T ′ = D, the
transition probability from CD to DD is
pCD→DD =
∑
x,y,z
∑
u,v,w
W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
· pxCpyCpzCpCDpuDpvDpwD
p3Cp
3
D
, (S20)
where x, y, z, and D, are the strategies neighbouring C,
while u, v, w, and C are the strategies neighbouring D. The
probabilities for the remaining 11 transitions TT ′→T ′T ′ are
obtainable in an entirely analogous manner.
Another ingredient in calculating how global densities
pSS′ change is to recognise that, in response to transition
TT ′→T ′T ′, the local number of SS′ pairs, denoted ∆nSS′
changes as well. We express this latter change in terms of
the abundance of strategy S and/or S′ among x, y, and z,
denoted respectively nS = n
xyz
S and nS′ = n
xyz
S′ . Using the
example from above, i.e., the transition from CD toDD, we
have ∆nCC = −2nC . Table I lists all possible ∆nSS′ val-
ues in response to all 12 transitions of the form TT ′→T ′T ′.
We now have all the ingredients necessary to specify the
dynamics of any global density pSS′ brought about by tran-
sitions involving the TT ′ pair. To do so, we need to calcu-
late a weighted sum of changes in the number of SS′ pairs
iii
caused by transitions TT ′→T ′T ′, where the weights are the
probabilities of each particular transition taking place. For
TABLE I: The change in the number of SS′ pairs due to transitions
TT ′→T ′T ′. Numbers nS = nxyzS and/or nS′ = nxyzS′ respectively
signify the abundance of strategies S and/or S′ among x, y, and z.
Pairs DC, LC, HC, LD, HD, and HL are left out due to the
symmetry in Eq. (S13).
SS′ CD → DD DC → CD CL→ LL LC → CC
CC −2nC 2(nC + 1) −2nC 2(nC + 1)
DD 2(nD + 1) −2nD 0 0
LL 0 0 2(nL + 1) −2nL
HH 0 0 0 0
CD nC − nD − 1 nD − nC − 1 −nD nD
CL −nL nL nC − nL − 1 nL − nC − 1
CH −nH nH −nH nH
DL nL −nL nD −nD
DH nH −nH 0 0
LH 0 0 nH −nH
SS′ CH → HH HC → CC DL→ LL LD → DD
CC −2nC 2(nC + 1) 0 0
DD 0 0 −2nD 2(nD + 1)
LL 0 0 2(nL + 1) −2nL
HH 2(nH + 1) −nH 0 0
CD −nD nD −nC nC
CL −nL nL nC −nC
CH nC − nH − 1 nH − nC − 1 0 0
DL 0 0 nD − nL − 1 nL − nD − 1
DH nD −nD −nH nH
LH nL −nL nH −nH
SS′ DH → HH HD → DD LH → HH HL→ LL
CC 0 0 0 0
DD −2nD 2(nD + 1) 0 0
LL 0 0 −2nL 2(nL + 1)
HH 2(nH + 1) −2nH 2(nH + 1) −2nH
CD −nC nC 0 0
CL 0 0 −nC nC
CH nC −nC nC −nC
DL −nL nL −nD nD
DH nD − nH − 1 nH − nD − 1 nD −nD
LH nL −nL nL − nH − 1 nH − nL − 1
example:
p˙CC =
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzC + 1] pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw
·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw
·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
+ 2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzC + 1] pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw
·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw
·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
+ 2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzC + 1] pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw
·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw
·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
.
The dynamics of other pairs is obtainable in an analogous
manner using Eq. (S19) and Table I. Although in an evolu-
tionary game with four strategies there are 16 pairs in to-
tal, we need to follow only ten because of the symmetry ex-
pressed by Eq. (S13). One more pair could be eliminated by
constraint ∑
S,S′∈{C,D,L,H}
pSS′ = 1 (S21)
if desired. We however keep track of the following 10 pairs:
CC, DD, LL, HH , CD, CL, CH , DL, DH , and LH .
A full specification of the pair dynamics is given below the
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p˙DD =
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzD + 1] pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzD + 1] pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzD + 1] pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
p˙LL =
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzL + 1] pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzL + 1] pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzL + 1] pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
p˙HH =
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzH + 1] pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzH + 1] pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
[nxyzH + 1] pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
vp˙CD =
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC −nxyzD −1
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzD −nxyzC −1
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
+
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
p˙CL =
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC −nxyzL −1
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzL −nxyzC −1
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
+
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
vi
p˙CH =
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC −nxyzH −1
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzH −nxyzC −1
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
+
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzC
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
p˙DL =
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD −nxyzL −1
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzL −nxyzD −1
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
+
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
vii
p˙DH =
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD −nxyzH −1
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzH −nxyzD −1
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
+
2 pCD
p3Cp
3
D
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
+
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzD
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
p˙LH =
2 pLH
p3Lp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL −nxyzH −1
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwH )
+
∑
x,y,z
nxyzH −nxyzL −1
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwL )
+
2 pCL
p3Cp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwC )
+
2 pCH
p3Cp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pCxpCypCz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzC ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pCupCvpCw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwC )
+
2 pDL
p3Dp
3
L
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pLupLvpLw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwL )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzH
2 pLxpLypLz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzL ← PuvwD )
+
2 pDH
p3Dp
3
H
·

∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pDxpDypDz
∑
u,v,w
pHupHvpHw ·W (P xyzD ← PuvwH )
− ∑
x,y,z
nxyzL
2 pHxpHypHz
∑
u,v,w
pDupDvpDw ·W (P xyzH ← PuvwD )
